SCARBOROUGH — The United States is currently installing a second radar station in Trinidad and Tobago, with the new installation going up at the ANR Robinson International Airport in Tobago.
Trinidad and Tobago already hosts a primary radar facility at Piarco International Airport on the main island of Trinidad, which supports air traffic control and regional surveillance.
The new installation in Tobago, confirmed by Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar on November 27–28, 2025, involves US Marines assisting with radar upgrades and surveillance enhancements at ANR Robinson International Airport.
This is aimed at improving border security, combating narcotics trafficking in regional waters, and bolstering airport infrastructure, under the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement signed in December 2024.
Recent developments include multiple US military aircraft landings at the airport (e.g., C-17A Globemaster III and C-130J Super Hercules) and imagery showing radar equipment on-site.
The project has sparked regional concerns, particularly from Venezuela, but the Trinidad and Tobago government has emphasized it’s not linked to military actions against any neighbor.
This marks an expansion of US-Trinidad and Tobago security cooperation, following similar (but unapproved) US requests in nearby Grenada.
The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is a bilateral defense pact that governs the temporary presence and activities of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Trinidad and Tobago for mutually agreed purposes, such as joint training, disaster response, and security cooperation. It outlines legal protections, jurisdictional rights, and logistical support to facilitate interoperability between the two nations’ armed forces. Trinidad and Tobago has hosted U.S. forces under SOFA frameworks since 2007, with periodic renewals and amendments to align with evolving security needs and laws.The most recent iteration, signed on December 10, 2024, by Trinidad and Tobago’s Minister of National Security Fitzgerald Hinds and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) representatives, represents an amendment and extension of the prior 2013 SOFA (originally entered into force on May 22, 2013). This version took effect on January 1, 2025, and has no fixed expiration date unless renegotiated or terminated by either party. It was approved by Trinidad and Tobago’s Cabinet on December 7, 2024, following legal review by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF), the Attorney General’s office, and the National Security Ministry.Historical Context
- 2007: Initial SOFA established, focusing on basic military-to-military engagements.
- 2013: Renewal and expansion via exchange of diplomatic notes (TIAS 13-522), designating the U.S. as a “designated state” under Trinidad and Tobago’s Visiting Forces Act (Chapter 14:04). This allowed for temporary U.S. personnel presence without visa requirements for official duties.
- Subsequent Extensions: Renewed unaltered in 2015, 2016, 2017 (TIAS 17-1229), 2019–2020 (TIAS 20-101), 2022 (TIAS 22-630), and 2023 (TIAS 22-1219), each typically for 1–2 years to prevent lapses.
- 2024 Amendment: Builds on the 2013 framework but includes clarifications (e.g., explicit inclusion of DoD civilian employees for immunities) and indefinite duration to “bring the agreement in line with U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago laws.” The full text of the 2024 version has not been publicly disclosed, but it mirrors prior iterations in substance.
The agreement aligns with broader U.S.-Caribbean security initiatives, including the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and Trinidad and Tobago’s accession to the Treaty of San José (December 7, 2024), which combats regional drug trafficking.Key ProvisionsBased on the publicly available 2013 SOFA text (which forms the core of the 2024 amendment) and descriptions from official sources, the agreement includes the following core elements:
| Provision Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Personnel Coverage | Applies to U.S. Armed Forces members and DoD civilian employees temporarily present in Trinidad and Tobago for “mutually agreed activities” (e.g., exercises, training, humanitarian aid, counter-narcotics operations). Excludes permanent basing. |
| Entry and Status | U.S. personnel enter without visas or passports for official duties. Trinidad and Tobago designates the U.S. as a “designated state” under its Visiting Forces Act, ensuring streamlined access. |
| Jurisdictional Immunity | – U.S. retains primary jurisdiction over its personnel for offenses committed in the course of official duties. – Trinidad and Tobago retains jurisdiction for off-duty offenses or crimes against locals, but the U.S. must be notified and can request waivers. – Immunity from arrest or detention for official acts; driving licenses and vehicle registrations are recognized. |
| Tax and Financial Exemptions | – No taxes, duties, or similar charges on U.S. personnel for activities under the SOFA. – Duty-free import/export of personal property, equipment, supplies, technology, and services for official use. – Access to Trinidad and Tobago’s radio spectrum and telecommunications without fees. |
| Logistics and Support | – Mutual use of facilities (e.g., airfields, ports) for agreed operations. – Cost-sharing for services like fuel, maintenance, and security. – Environmental protections: U.S. agrees to comply with local laws and remediate any damage from its activities. |
| Termination and Review | – Either party can terminate with 180 days’ notice. – Annual consultations to review implementation. |
These provisions emphasize cooperation rather than unilateral U.S. actions; all deployments require Trinidad and Tobago’s approval.Strategic Purpose and Regional ContextThe SOFA supports U.S.-Trinidad and Tobago collaboration on shared threats like narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, and disaster response in the southern Caribbean. U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral Alvin Holsey described it as deepening “strategic collaboration on a host of issues” during the signing. It was bundled with four other pacts on December 10, 2024:
- Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA): Enables mutual provision of logistics (e.g., fuel, supplies) during operations.
- Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Technical Assistance Field Team (CBSI-TAFT): Provides U.S. training and equipment to the TTDF.
- SOUTHCOM Human Rights Initiative: Ensures compliance with international human rights standards in joint activities.
- Treaty of San José Accession: Enhances regional anti-drug efforts.
Amid U.S. tensions with Venezuela (e.g., over the Essequibo dispute with Guyana), media reports suggested the SOFA could facilitate U.S. troop requests for “conflict” scenarios or natural disasters near borders. However, Prime Minister Keith Rowley (PNM administration) firmly denied this, stating in December 2024: “We don’t countenance a breach of peace in the region and we will not facilitate any such move.” He emphasized that the SOFA does not compel Trinidad and Tobago to host forces or violate the UN Charter, and any U.S. request would require sovereign approval. The U.S. Embassy echoed this, clarifying the pact’s focus on interoperability, not aggression.Controversies and Criticisms
- Venezuela Concerns: Venezuelan officials and regional analysts viewed the timing (post-2024 U.S. election sanctions on Maduro) as escalatory, potentially positioning Trinidad and Tobago as a U.S. staging ground. Rowley countered that it preserves neutrality and supports energy talks with Caracas (e.g., Dragon and Cocuina-Manakin gas fields).
- Domestic Debate:
- MSJ leader David Abdulah (December 2024) argued it creates “uncertainty” and signals vulnerability to U.S. influence.
- In October–November 2025, under the new UNC-led government of Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, opposition PNM leader Keith Rowley defended the 2024 signing, rejecting claims it “opened the door” to U.S. troops. Persad-Bissessar affirmed it enhances security without compromising sovereignty, citing vulnerabilities like 10,000+ murders and migrant influxes over two decades.
- Public Scrutiny: Calls for transparency grew, as the amended text remains classified, though officials assure it aligns with the 2013 version.
Overall, the SOFA underscores Trinidad and Tobago’s balancing act: leveraging U.S. support for security and energy while maintaining regional diplomacy. For the full 2013 text, refer to U.S. State Department archives (TIAS 13-522); the 2024 amendments are not yet public.
US security agreement with Grenada
As of November 29, 2025, US security engagement with Grenada remains focused on longstanding bilateral cooperation in law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and humanitarian assistance, rather than formal military basing. However, this occurs against the backdrop of a significant US military buildup across the broader Caribbean, primarily driven by the Trump administration’s aggressive campaign against Venezuelan drug trafficking and alleged “narcoterrorism.” Below, I outline the specifics of US-Grenada ties, the regional escalation, and Grenada’s positioning within it.US-Grenada Security Relations: Key ElementsGrenada and the US have maintained cooperative security ties since the 1983 US-led invasion (Operation Urgent Fury), which restored democratic governance after a Marxist coup. Current relations emphasize non-military support, with no permanent US bases on the island. Grenada lacks a formal military, relying instead on the Royal Grenada Police Force (RGPF) for defense.
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Ongoing Agreements | – Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI): Provides US training, equipment, and funding for counter-narcotics, border security, and maritime interdiction. Grenada has received vehicles, vessels, and technical aid. – Maritime Law Enforcement Treaty (1995): Allows joint patrols and ship-boarding for drug interdiction. – Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Treaties (1996): Facilitate intelligence sharing and prosecutions. – No active Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); cooperation is ad hoc via SOUTHCOM. |
| Recent Activities | – November 17–19, 2025: US military personnel from the US Embassy in Guyana conducted a medical skills exchange with 28 RGPF officers, focusing on life-saving techniques for disaster response and operations. – Historical US aid includes humanitarian assistance post-Hurricane Ivan (2004) and counter-narcotics training via the US Coast Guard. |
| Economic/Development Ties | – Grenada benefits from US aid under the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) framework, including $90 million in concessional financing from the OPEC Fund (signed June 2025) for health, energy, and transport—indirectly supporting security infrastructure. |
These efforts align with US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) priorities: disrupting transnational crime while building partner capacity. US officials describe Grenada as a “key ally” in regional stability, but engagement is limited compared to larger partners like Trinidad and Tobago.The 2025 Caribbean Military Buildup: OverviewSince late August 2025, the US has executed its largest non-disaster-related military deployment in the Caribbean since the 1989 Panama invasion, involving ~15,000 personnel, 12+ warships, and extensive air assets. Officially framed as Operation Southern Spear—a “war on narcoterrorists” targeting Venezuelan-linked cartels like Tren de Aragua—the operation has included 21+ airstrikes on suspected drug vessels, killing over 80 people (per UN estimates). Critics, including Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, argue it’s a pretext for regime change, echoing 2019–2020 sanctions and coup attempts.
| Key Components | US Assets Deployed | Strategic Focus |
|---|---|---|
| Naval | – USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group (arrived Nov 11): 4,000+ sailors, F/A-18 jets, destroyers (e.g., USS Gravely, USS Mahan). – USS Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group: 4,500 Marines, amphibious ships for rapid insertion. – Submarines (e.g., nuclear-powered SSN), special ops vessel MV Ocean Trader. | Surveillance of Venezuelan waters; interdiction of “go-fast” boats; potential strikes on labs or leadership. |
| Air | – P-8 Poseidon spy planes, F-35 fighters at reactivated Roosevelt Roads base (Puerto Rico, reopened Nov 2025). – MH-60 helicopters, B-52 bombers for training; 5+ T-38 trainers since Sept. | Intelligence gathering; live-fire exercises off Trinidad (Oct 2025). FAA flight bans near Puerto Rico (Nov 2025–Mar 2026) for “security reasons.” |
| Ground/Logistics | – 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) at José Aponte de la Torre Airport (Puerto Rico). – Support at St. Croix (USVI): Radar systems, KC-135 refuelers. | Training in Puerto Rico/Arroyo (Oct 2025); food/logistics contracts through Dec 2025, extendable to 2028. |
Details of SOFA agreement with Guyana
The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Guyana is a bilateral pact that governs the temporary presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Guyana for purposes such as joint exercises, training, counter-narcotics operations, security assistance, and humanitarian aid. It provides legal protections, jurisdictional rights, and logistical support to enable U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) activities without establishing permanent bases. Guyana has hosted U.S. forces under SOFA provisions since 2000, with extensions to maintain continuity amid regional security challenges, particularly the ongoing Essequibo territorial dispute with Venezuela.The current SOFA framework stems from an original agreement effected by exchange of notes on December 28 and 29, 2000, which entered into force on December 29, 2000. It was extended by notes exchanged on April 4 and May 10, 2006, effective from December 29, 2005. Unlike some Caribbean neighbors (e.g., Trinidad and Tobago’s indefinite 2024 amendment), Guyana’s SOFA has no fixed expiration but can be terminated by either party with six months’ written notice. The full text remains publicly available via U.S. State Department archives, with no major amendments reported as of November 29, 2025.Historical Context
- Pre-2000: U.S.-Guyana military ties date to the post-independence era, focusing on counter-narcotics under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). No formal SOFA existed until tensions arose from regional instability.
- 2000: Initial SOFA signed amid U.S. efforts to bolster hemispheric security post-Cold War, covering temporary U.S. personnel for exercises and assistance programs.
- 2006 Extension: Renewed to prevent lapse, aligning with Guyana’s accession to CBSI and mutual interests in maritime security.
- 2010s–2020s: Periodic U.S. engagements (e.g., Tradewinds exercises) operated under this framework. In January 2021, a complementary Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was signed, formalizing logistics exchanges like fuel and supplies.
- 2024–2025 Escalation: Amid Venezuela’s Essequibo claims and a December 2023 referendum, U.S. support intensified. A March 2025 security cooperation pact enhanced intelligence-sharing and joint defense, described as a “quasi-security guarantee” for Guyana’s sovereignty, including offshore oil protection. This builds on the SOFA without altering its core terms. U.S. SOUTHCOM visits (e.g., November 2024 and March 2025) discussed readiness, with no new SOFA amendments but increased rotational training.
The SOFA supports broader U.S. Caribbean strategies, including CBSI and the Treaty of San José for anti-drug efforts, while Guyana balances ties with Brazil and CARICOM for regional mediation.Key ProvisionsDrawing from the 2000 SOFA text (extended in 2006), the agreement emphasizes mutual benefits and sovereignty. It applies only to temporary U.S. presence for “agreed purposes,” requiring Guyana’s approval for activities.
| Provision Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Personnel Coverage | Covers U.S. Armed Forces members and DoD civilian employees temporarily in Guyana for military exercises, training, counter-drug activities, security assistance, or other mutually agreed purposes. Excludes permanent stationing or combat operations. |
| Entry and Status | U.S. personnel enter/exit without visas using official IDs. Treated equivalently to U.S. Embassy staff for privileges; authorized to wear uniforms and carry weapons per orders. Driving licenses and vehicle registrations from the U.S. are recognized. |
| Jurisdictional Immunity | – U.S. retains primary jurisdiction over personnel for on-duty offenses. – Guyana retains jurisdiction for off-duty crimes or acts against locals, with U.S. notification rights and waiver requests. – Immunity from arrest/detention for official acts; claims for damages from U.S. activities settled via U.S. law (fair compensation for third-party losses). |
| Tax and Financial Exemptions | – Exemption from taxes/duties on personal property, equipment, supplies, and services imported/exported for official use. – No fees for radio spectrum or telecommunications access. Mutual waiver of claims for injuries/deaths/damages arising from covered activities (except contractual). |
| Logistics and Support | – Access to Guyanese facilities (e.g., airfields, ports) for agreed operations. – Cost-sharing for fuel, maintenance, and security services. – Environmental compliance: U.S. adheres to local laws and remediates any damage. Separate agreements possible for air operations or environmental specifics. |
| Termination and Review | – Terminable with six months’ diplomatic notice. – Annual consultations encouraged for implementation and adjustments. |
These terms prioritize cooperation, with Guyana accepting responsibility for securing U.S. personnel and property.Strategic Purpose and Regional ContextThe SOFA facilitates U.S.-Guyana collaboration on transnational threats like drug trafficking, illegal migration, and natural disasters, while bolstering Guyana’s defense against Venezuelan encroachments. U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander Adm. Alvin Holsey highlighted it in 2025 as key to “strategic partnership” amid the Guyana-Venezuela crisis. Recent activities include:
- U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) engagements (November 2024–March 2025) for training Guyana Defence Force (GDF) in medical, engineering, and operational skills.
- Rotational U.S. specialized teams (2024–2025) for maritime security and disaster response.
- Integration with the 2021 ACSA for efficient logistics during joint operations like Tradewinds.
In the 2025 U.S. Caribbean naval deployment (Operation Southern Spear), Guyana endorsed U.S. efforts as protective against Venezuelan “narcoterrorism,” allowing overflights and port access under SOFA provisions. Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo stated in October 2025: “You cannot trust Maduro,” underscoring reliance on U.S. deterrence.Bundled pacts include the 2025 security agreement for intelligence/joint coordination and CBSI for equipment/training.Controversies and Criticisms
- Venezuelan Objections: Maduro’s government views the SOFA as enabling U.S. “militarization” of Guyana, potentially staging aggression over Essequibo. In December 2024, Venezuela threatened retaliation, citing U.S. “enclave” creation. Russian support for Caracas amplified this, warning of escalated naval presence.
- Regional Tensions: CARICOM urged de-escalation (February 2024 Argyle Declaration), with Brazil mediating to avoid U.S. dominance. Critics like Orinoco Tribune (December 2024) argue it converts Guyana into a “military enclave,” risking proxy conflicts.
- Domestic Views: Guyana’s government (under President Irfaan Ali) defends it as sovereignty-enhancing, citing GDF modernization needs. Opposition voices express sovereignty concerns, but public support is high (70% in 2025 polls) amid oil boom vulnerabilities. No major protests reported.
- Transparency: The 2000/2006 texts are public, but 2025 addendums (e.g., oil infrastructure protection) are partially classified, prompting calls for parliamentary review.
The SOFA positions Guyana as a U.S. ally in hemispheric security without full basing commitments, testing regional neutrality. For the full 2000 text, see U.S. State Department TIAS 00-1229. Monitor SOUTHCOM updates for potential 2026 reviews amid ongoing Venezuela tensions.
